Author(s):Keywords:
Kanita Ćurevac (DE)auctions, bidder participation, entry costs
Abstract:
Auctions are vital in economic transactions, from private sales to government procurement. A key aspect is bidders’ participation decisions, especially when entry incurs costs. This paper compares two models: Levin and Smith (1994), where bidders pay entry fees before learning valuations—concluding fees are never optimal—and Menezes and Monteiro (2000), where bidders first learn valuations, showing fees can screen low-value participants and increase revenue. The paper explores theoretical foundations, equilibrium strategies, and revenue implications, offering insights into endogenous entry, revenue equivalence, and bidder behavior in sealed-bid auctions. This research enhances auction design understanding in settings with costly participation.
Cite as:
Kanita Ćurevac (2025) Entry fees and bidder behavior in sealed – bid auctions. Quality 2025 (S. Jašarević, editor), ISSN 1512-9268, Neum, B&H, 3-5 June 2025., pp. 205-210

DISCLAIMER: Professional – scientific papers published in Conference proceedings are published in the original. Papers were reviewed by members of the Scientific Committee. Authors are responsible for technical and linguistic correctness of the text.
WARNING: This is an open access publication which means that all content is freely available without charge to the user or his/her institution. Users are allowed to read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of the articles in this journal without asking prior permission from the publisher or the author. This is in accordance with the BOAI definition of open access.
The greatest possible effort is put to ensure that the Proceedings are complete and accurate, but it does not imply any warranty or liability. The authors and publisher have no obligation or responsibility to any person or entity in connection with any damage or loss due to the information published in the Conference Proceedings.

Recommended Articles